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ABSTRACT 
The construction industry has, over a long period, been criticised for its short term 
“hit-and-run” relationships which are focused on win-lose situations and poor 
performance. Despite the wide recognition of these problems the industry persistently 
resists the radical demanded of it. This paper attempts to investigate why this might 
be the case by reviewing prevailing safeguarding practices within the current 
commercial systems and structures through literature review and industry observation. 
 Findings reveal that clients and decision makers often tend to safeguard their 
project-specific assets, against opportunism and exploitation, through the deployment 
of formal contractual arrangements and governance structures. These arrangements 
and structures typically dominate the management of the project delivery often to the 
detriment of the project itself; but because there is a belief that interests are 
safeguarded, clients and decision makers feel they have taken the best course of 
action. This goes a long way to explaining the coherence of the current construction 
model and provides the basic information for preparing a route to the radical change 
required to move to lean methodologies. 
KEYWORDS: 
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INTRODUCTION 
During his presentation at the IGLC 20 Industry Day in San Diego in 2012, Gregory 
Howell then the president of LCI, referred to the prevailing construction approach as 
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a “very coherent model” when explaining the barriers to lean implementation. Yet the 
performance of the industry has been widely criticised, often regarded as 
confrontational, risk averse, and lacking trust and capacity for innovation and 
improvement (Zaghloul and Hartman, 2003; Eriksson and Laan, 2007; Eriksson, 
Nilsson and Atkin, 2008). Why therefore is the model so coherent and so embedded? 
This paper uses Transaction Cost Economics to explain the current inertia focusing 
particularly on the idea of self-interest (or safe-guarding) and how this is a source of 
waste hitherto unacknowledged.  
Waste in construction originally addressed physical waste but the discussion 
widened with the introduction of the “lean” process waste. Both of these types of 
waste can be directly associated with production. In this we can say that production is 
about doing work of some sort and that this includes the production of design 
information and specification. This understanding of waste encourages the 
improvement of current processes rather than radical new system design. Does this go 
part way to explain why Liker (2004) observe many lean implementations stalling 
and not achieving their full potential?  A wider examination and conception of waste 
is needed and one aspect of this is the consideration of the organisational, commercial 
and institutional environments that surround the design and delivery of construction 
projects. The foundation for understanding waste begins with defining value which in 
turn enables non-value to be identified. Traditionally waste (non-value) has been 
identified as anything that consumes resources but adds no value – the constituents of 
value have similarly been widely discussed but again mostly from within the design 
and delivery processes. It is clear that some non-value is essential and that much of 
this is in the logistical and supporting structures surrounding project delivery. The 
understanding of value and non-value (waste) within the wider organisational, 
commercial and institutional environments is more difficult to conceptualise not least 
because it requires a critical evaluation of the activities of different professions (e.g. 
lawyers, accountants, human resource managers, quantity surveyors and so on) and 
varying organisational cultures/structures/systems/behaviours. 
This evaluation also has to draw upon theory from disciplines outside both 
construction and manufacturing such as economics, law and sociology, if we explain 
the phenomenon of coherence within the current construction project delivery 
approach. The current approach contains many inefficiencies that have been 
frequently attributed to factors such as industry fragmentation (Egan, 1998) 
adversarial hierarchy structure of projects (Ghassemi and Becerik-Gerber, 2011), 
obsolete procurement methods (Eriksson and Laan, 2007), confusing and treacherous 
contractual arrangements (Hawkins, 2012; Cox, and Thompson, 1997), the highly 
competitive cost-driven environment (Bresnen and Marshall, 2000) and the sequential 
organisation of construction processes (Koskela, 2000). Due to the transient and 
discrete nature of many of the construction projects, clients and decision makers, in 
practice, tend to recognise these as risks and seek to protect their project-specific 
investments and assets, from exploitation and opportunism, through the deployment 
of formal contractual arrangements and governance mechanisms. Since, most clients 
who procure construction projects lack experience and may only ever build once or 
twice (Love, Davis, Ellis, and Cheung, 2010); they invariably seek advice from 
lawyers and from those who are familiar with construction contracts and the laws 
related to them (e.g. quantity surveyors). These lawyers or consultants would 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE SAFEGUARDING PROBLEM IN CONSTRUCTION 
PROCUREMENT: UNPICKING THE COHERENT CURRENT MODEL 
COST MANAGEMENT 311 
accordingly be paid, as part of their agreed fees, for providing means for safeguarding 
their client’s rights and transaction-specific assets. Unsurprisingly, in some cases 
these means can, for example, include the use of privileged conditions of contract, 
where clients may not mind protecting themselves from any risks, even if, this occurs 
at the expense of others and ultimately themselves. For instance, the inappropriate 
risk allocation in the use of disclaimer (exculpatory) clauses which can attract 
between 8% - 20% of the total project cost as contingency (Zaghloul and Hartman 
2003). In this case, a contingency that clearly consumes resource without adding 
practical value and thus conforms to the archetypal definition of waste. However, in 
most cases, clients’ main intentions are to control opportunism and utilise efficient 
governance of their transactions. But, arguably, they may not be aware of how their 
procurement decisions and arrangements may affect the likelihood of creating a 
cooperative environment (Eriksson, Nilsson and Atkin, 2008) and thus impact project 
performance and outcomes. According to Williamson (2000) “Any issue that arises as 
or can be reformulated as a contracting issue can be examined to advantage in 
transaction cost economising terms” (p599, 608).  Thus, transaction cost economics 
(TCE) seems to provide insights into why current practice seems to be coherent by 
explaining a model focused on managing contracts rather than managing production. 
TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
It is Coase’s seminal article "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) which explicitly 
introduced the concept of transaction costs into economic analysis; and drew to our 
attention that there are transaction costs that had been assumed to be zero in prior 
theorizing. Transaction costs are the costs of specifying what is being exchanged and 
of enforcing the consequent agreements (i.e. contractual clauses) against the exchange 
partner (North, 1994; Ting, Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007). Its focus is on the 
transaction or “doing the deal” rather than “doing the work” and is typified by the 
frequent complaint from a variety of practitioners that re-tendering sub-contract 
packages in order to reduce cost usually causes costly knock-on problems. By riding 
roughshod over relationships the constant drive to reduce cost often has the opposite 
effect, causing margin slippage and increasing the likelihood of costly dispute as all 
parties seek to safeguard their financial position. Williamson (1975) categorises 
transaction costs into ex-ante and ex-post costs. Ex-ante costs comprise the costs of 
tendering, negotiating and writing the contract (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997); while 
ex-post costs include the costs of: monitoring and measuring performance, 
implementing quality control systems, cost accounting, establishing layers of the 
managerial hierarchy, and dispute resolution processes (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). 
The TCE framework is underpinned by the interaction between two fundamental 
assumptions of human behaviour (i.e. opportunism and bounded rationality) and two 
key dimensions of transactions (i.e. asset specificity and uncertainty). There is also a 
third behavioural assumption of risk neutrality and a third transactional dimension of 
transaction frequency or relational exchange (Williamson, 1985).  In this opportunism 
as "self-interest seeking with guile" (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) implying that given the 
opportunity, decision makers may deceitfully seek to serve their self-interests. Muris 
(1981, p. 521, cited in Ting, Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007) adds to this and argues 
that opportunism arises when a party “behaves contrary to the other party’s 
understanding of their contract, but not necessarily contrary to the agreement’s 
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explicit terms, leading to a transfer of wealth from one party to the other.” In reality, 
opportunistic behaviours are part of human nature, and therefore they often exist in 
exchange-relationships (Ting, Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007). However, it can be 
argued that although opportunism may, initially, lead to increased outcomes for the 
opportunistic party, it actually has the potential to restrict value creation and decrease 
revenues for both parties in a relationship, that is because considerable amounts of 
resources would then have to be spent on enforcing, monitoring and controlling 
functions instead of employing those resources for other productive purposes (Ting, 
Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007). Bounded rationality simply means that decision 
makers act rationally but have constraints on their cognitive, analytical and data-
processing capabilities, especially in uncertain and complex environments 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). According to Dietrich (1994: 19), the concept of 
‘bounded rationality’ in transactions is based on two principles. First, that there are 
limits on a human’s ability to process information without error. Secondly, that it is 
not wise to suggest that past experience can help in every situation encountered. Asset 
specificity refers to investments (transaction specific assets) that have a ‘lock-in 
effect’ (Ting, Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007) because they make it difficult to 
terminate a relationship and select other parties without acquiring losses. Uncertainty 
can be defined in its simplest form as what is known in comparison to what needs to 
be known. During transactions (ex-ante and ex-post contractual stages), two types of 
uncertainty are encountered: behavioural and environmental transaction uncertainty. 
TCE conceptualises ‘behavioural uncertainty’ as the amount of difficulty associated 
with monitoring and evaluating the performance of the exchange partners against 
established contractual agreements; while ‘environmental uncertainty’ is theorised as 
unanticipated changes in circumstances and the associated complexity surrounding 
the transaction context (Williamson, 1985). 
In short, TC theory assumes that the greater the transaction uncertainty and asset 
specificity and the lower the transaction frequency, the higher the transaction costs 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This understanding underpins much of the accepted 
procurement theory and practice taught in Universities and recommended by 
professional institutions. It also suggests that exchange cannot be fully specified ex 
ante, and that contractual performance cannot be easily verified ex post, due to 
bounded rationality and uncertainty factors (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Having 
provided an explanation to the theory’s constructs and main assumptions; next we 
discuss the consequences of the interplay that occurs between these constructs, which 
in turn lead to a number of governance challenges. 
THE SAFEGUARDING PROBLEM AND THE GOVERNANCE MECHANISM 
A ‘safeguarding problem’ arises when a firm deploys transaction-specific assets and 
worries that its exchange-partner may opportunistically try to exploit these unique 
investments (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
asset specificity and opportunism are the antecedents of the safeguarding problem. 
Figure 1 represents a simplified graphical representation of the governance problems 
and possible solutions. According to Rindfleisch and Heide (1997), the basic premise 
of TC analysis is that if those three governance problems described above are absent 
or low, decision-makers will accordingly favour market governance to vertical 
integration (the make-or-buy decision). Alternatively, if the transaction costs required 
for overcoming the governance problems exceed the production cost advantages of 
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the market, firms will favour internal organization (Coase, 1937). Williamson (1985) 
has augmented this conventional approach to transaction economising and introduced 
the concept of ‘relational contracting’ as a more positive and sustaining form of 
governance which solves governance problems through behavioural norms rather 
than potential sanctions (Ting, Chen, and Bartholomew, 2007).  
Figure 1: A basic model of transactional governance problems and solutions 
In essence, TCE has the objective of total cost minimisation (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997) and assumes that transactions will be governed by the institutional 
arrangements that are most efficient (Bradach and Eccles, 1989). This implies that, 
according to TCE, the institutional arrangement chosen will be that which reduces the 
total costs (transactional or organizational costs plus production costs) of undertaking 
and coordinating those activities. Similarly, clients when deploying their procurement 
arrangements in general, and safeguarding techniques and approaches in specific, 
should therefore put into consideration the impact of their decisions on project-team’s  
performance and total costs. The situation in construction however does not confirm 
to this explanation as the numerous one-off construction clients and their decision 
makers attempt to implement a “buy-it” transaction in a “make-it” environment 
where a team comes together for a specific purpose (to deliver the project). The 
consistent failure of this approach to perform has created increasingly draconian and 
wasteful activity in order to safeguard parties from the failures. There are many 
safeguarding approaches used in construction procurement and these include the use 
of disclaimer clauses; conventional insurance arrangements; collateral warranties; 
performance bonds and cash retentions; lump sum pricing strategies. The discussion 
of imperfect safeguarding approaches used in construction must start with an 
examination of standard forms of contact. 
STANDARD FORMS OF CONTRACT - AN IMPERFECT 
SAFEGUARDING APPROACH IN CONSTRUCTION  
Construction parties rely heavily on contract formalisation through the use of 
standard forms of contracts (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). Theoretically, standard forms 
of contract optimise the balance of risk and responsibility between the parties, and 
eliminate ex-ante transactional costs required for re-drafting and getting familiar with 
new contracts (Cox and Thompson, 1997). Their main advantage is that they enable a 
body of experience in their use to be developed among the whole industry 
(Williamson, Wilson, Skitmore, and Runeson, 2004). This includes the formation of 
an established body of case law which can assist in the drafting and interpretation of 
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contracts (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Thus, as a safeguarding technique, they are 
supposed to reduce the amount of time and risk involved for contract administrators 
and tenderers as well.  
However, there are many problems related to the use of standard forms of contract. 
These forms of contract are drafted by third parties who focused their formulation of 
the contracts on specific types of projects; thus one of the main problems associated 
with the use of un-amended standard forms of contract is their inability to adapt to the 
context in which they operate (Laryea and Hughes, 2009). Nevertheless, in practice, 
clients rarely use standard-form contracts without making some amendments to them 
(Laryea and Hughes, 2009), and the same applies to subcontracts. A study by Laryea 
and Hughes (2009) which was based on four observational case studies in two of the 
top contracting companies in the UK, showed that these amendments made by clients 
are mostly related to payment issues and legal arrangements. Similarly, an 
exploratory study of 11 Swedish construction projects, by Osipova and Erksson 
(2011), reported that in all 11 projects, clients made amendments to the general 
conditions of contract to transfer more risks to the contractor; many of them were 
applied to the length of guarantee and additional insurance. Laryea and Hughes (2009) 
revealed that a general perception exists among contractors that clients amend 
conditions of standard contracts and introduce their own special clauses, in order to 
gain an advantage rather than genuinely to suit the project needs. Additionally, 
Hawkins (2012) warns that users making amendments to standard forms of contract at 
negotiation stages do not always ensure that all the interlinked clauses affected by the 
amendments are also amended leading to ambiguities and encouraging opportunistic 
behaviour. Additionally, a study by Love et al. (2010) identified onerous and one 
sided amendments to standard forms, often drafted by lawyers to improve their clients’ 
position, as one of the underlying dynamic factors influencing disputes. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasise that lawyers and specialist 
surveyors are not the primary users of a contract (Sarhan, Pasquire, and King, 2014); 
it is the project parties’ ability to capture their meaning which is fundamental for 
contract performance (Rameezdeen and Rodrigo, 2013). In general, textual 
complexity of standard forms of contract, in terms of readability and 
comprehensiveness, may lead to misinterpretation and lack of common understanding 
between project parties; thus supporting arms’ length relationships and potential time-
consuming and costly disputes (Rameezdeen and Rajapakse, 2007). Additionally, one 
of the major critiques concerning the adoption of standard form of contracts is 
associated with the dominance of adversarial dispute resolution mechanisms within 
many of these contracts (Mante, Ndekugri, Ankrah, and Hammond, 2012). 
Furthermore, the availability of adjudication clauses as contained in standard forms of 
contract make disputes a less disruptive action for the parties concerned (Love, Davis, 
Ellis, and Cheung, 2010); thereby hindering collaboration efforts. 
In summary, it seems that the problems of standard forms of contract outweigh its 
advantages. The heavy reliance on the use of standard forms of contract, established 
by third parties, brings with it lots of formality and rigidity that stifles cooperation 
and focusses on the individual parties and their responsibilities; thereby driving a 
distance between project parties and encouraging opportunistic behaviour (Eriksson, 
Nilsson and Atkin, 2008). According to Cox and Thompson (1997, p. 132): 
“…Standard forms of contract are nothing more than instruments used by the parties 
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to seek strict liability and attach blame to events as they occur. Nevertheless, the 
industry's hands are tied to the standard forms and their traditional methods of 
contracting, even though they do not deliver satisfactory results. These methods, 
when linked with the prevailing adversarial culture and fragmented structure lead the 
parties away from 'trust' towards self-seeking interest ('opportunism')”. 
Nonetheless, Eriksson and Laan, (2007) suggest that the deep-rooted practice of 
using standard contracts in construction is only harmful, if they are used as 
“safeguards” in the absence of strong “relational norms”. Without good relationships 
between the project-parties, once a default occurs, they are most likely to refer back 
to the clauses of the standard contract which, in turn, may encourage opportunism and 
lead to adversarial ways of working (i.e. remedies of damages through legal actions).  
A recent example of this in the UK occurred in signalling renewal contracts for 
London Underground reported by Connor (2014). The first project went significantly 
over budget and programme along with technical difficulties. The same team, 
technology and contract conditions were used on a second project which finished 
significantly ahead of schedule and under budget. The project team attributed this 
success to putting the contract in a drawer and concentrating on working together to 
solve problems. This experience certainly questions the usefulness of contracts in 
production and emphasises the divide between the creative, problem solving delivery 
process and the safeguarding commercial process as described by Sarhan et al. (2014). 
This separation was confirmed independently through discussions with a large 
engineering design consultancy beginning to engage with lean. Team meetings had 
revealed a significant difference in the understanding of purpose across the business – 
one of the most useful aspects of bringing people together from different departments 
within the organisation to have conversations around purpose was the resulting 
changed perceptions about the business. This also confirms that project design and 
delivery becomes effective when it comprises a set of conversation acts rather than 
relying on documented directives. 
CONSTRUCTION PROCUREMENT 
In construction, there seems to be two general approaches to selecting a procurement 
system. The first would focus on designing a project organisation structure including 
a project operating system based on project needs and priorities, and then adapting a 
contractual arrangement that aligns the commercial interests of the project parties (e.g. 
Thomsen, et al., 2010) - a production oriented approach which aims to design and 
enhance flow processes. The second is a risk based approach which is mainly 
concerned with overcoming transactional governance problem and considers 'risk' to 
be the main criterion influencing procurement selection decisions. Advocators of this 
approach (e.g. Hibberd and Basden, 1996), cited in Love, Skitmore, and Earl, 1998), 
suggest that contractual arrangements should be primarily conducted for risk 
allocation and mitigation purposes. Thus, a debate exists in literature upon whether 
procurement arrangements should be adapted to support production system 
requirements or tailored to transactional characteristics.  
In construction, there is no ready-made product to buy (Eriksson and Laan, 2007). 
Both the client and the project-supply-chain have to interact in order to create the 
final product. Hence, there are substantial trends towards collaborative ways of 
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working as a means for improving project outcomes; it is therefore important to 
consider how construction clients and companies tend to protect (safeguard) their 
project-specific assets, against opportunism, during procurement procedures. Very 
little, if any studies, have sought to question the efficiency and effectiveness of 
safeguards crafted by contracting parties in construction procurement. Based on a 
comprehensive literature review various safeguarding approaches were identified 
(Table 1) and their impact on project performance and outcomes are analysed (Fig. 2).  
Table 1: A categorization of various safeguarding approaches within construction 
procurement according to their underpinning theoretical perspective and level of 
prevalence 
Conventional safeguarding approaches 
based on 'risk allocation' considerations 
Less prevalent safeguarding approaches based on 
'process flow' considerations 
Standard forms of contract Relational contracting 
Use of Disclaimer/Exculpatory clauses Shared risks and rewards 
Traditional insurance arrangements  Single project insurance  
Collateral warranties Latent defects insurance 
Surety/Performance bonds 
Pre-qualifications, direct negotiation, and IPD (e.g. Thomsen 
et al., 2010) - thus, no need for the use of bonds 
Lump sum and BoQ pricing systems 
Collaborative costing e.g. TVD (See e.g. Zimina, Ballard, and 
Pasquire, 2012) 
The 'risk averse' safeguarding approaches based on transactional considerations 
offer little incentive for cooperation to emerge; instead they entrench wasteful 
processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle (e.g. 
opportunism, unnecessary premiums, claims and disputes). By tailoring procurement 
decisions to 'transactional' characteristics, clients (or focal companies) concentrate on 
formal risk allocation, through contractual arrangements, in an attempt to maximise 
their own profits; thereby neglecting the significance of maintaining and enhancing 
the flow of production processes, and overlooking the interdependency between 
project partners in their efforts to maximise value. 
CONCLUSION 
Conventional safeguarding processes adopted by construction clients while deciding 
on their procurement options often complicate the problem rather than solve it. This 
study identified a number of imperfect taken for granted safeguarding techniques 
(Table 1) which stifle cooperation, lead to unnecessary costs, and entrench wasteful 
processes across the supply chain and throughout the project life cycle. It seems that 
clients and decision makers, in their attempt to overcome the safeguarding problem, 
mainly focus their attention and efforts on reducing ex-ante (i.e. pre-construction 
phase) transaction costs while giving less attention to the impact of their chosen 
procurement arrangements on ex-post costs. In that way, procurement decisions tend 
to be ultimately focussed on contract administration and shifting risks; and, arguably, 
risk aversion often distracts attention away from core efficiency purposes 
(Williamson, 1985).  That steps are taken to avoid risk and minimise cost seems to 
satisfy the need for decision makers to be accountable regardless of the effect of these 
actions. This continuing adherence to imperfect conventional procurement procedures 
is also due to institutional pressure exerted from third parties (e.g. consultants, 
quantity surveyors, lawyers, insurance companies, banks) who may have a vested 
interest (i.e. social and/or economic motivations) for the wide-spread use of these 
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inefficient procurement procedures. These factors combine to create the coherent 
current model for construction project delivery and their identification will help the 
development of new business models that embrace lean. 
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